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DESIGNING A FLEXIBLE WORLD FOR THE MANY:
“ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS” AND TITLE I OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Michael J. Powers1
This Note explores how courts interpret the meaning of “essential functions” under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. To be protected under the ADA, a
plaintiff must be able to perform the “essential functions” of her job with or without
a reasonable accommodation.  In general, courts follow one of two approaches
when interpreting this phrase. The first approach narrowly focuses on the em-
ployer’s judgment regarding which functions are essential. The second approach
considers the employer’s judgment, but looks beyond to consider the broader employ-
ment relationship. This Note argues that these different approaches have led to
varying levels of scrutiny, which ultimately hinders the ADA’s efforts to eliminate
discrimination. This Note asserts that these different approaches exist because Sec-
tion 12111(8) fails to clearly indicate which one courts should follow. As a result,
courts are able to apply that level of scrutiny they consider appropriate, instead of
that level of scrutiny Congress intended. To clarify the proper test that courts should
follow, this Note proposes a statutory amendment to Section 12111(8). This Note
concludes that this amendment is the most effective way to make Title I’s protections
more robust.
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed into law
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or Act).  Standing on the
South Lawn of the White House, the President declared that the
Act was “landmark” legislation amounting to a “comprehensive dec-
laration of equality for people with disabilities” similar in historical
significance to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that man-
dated fair and equal treatment for people of color.2  For President
Bush and those members of Congress who fought for the Act’s pas-
sage, July 26 represented nothing short of “another ‘Independence
Day,’ . . . [when] every man, woman and child with a disability can
now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equal-
ity, independence and freedom” in which they are guaranteed “the
1. J.D. Candidate, December 2014, University of Michigan Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Bagenstos for his invaluable comments and insight and the
Journal of Law Reform Notes Office for its continued support and hard work.
2. Press Release, President George H. W. Bush, Remarks During Ceremony for the
Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act, The White House, at 1-2 (July 26, 1990) (on
file with author).
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opportunity to blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic of the
American mainstream.”3  To usher in this new era, the ADA would
act as “a sledgehammer” to breakdown barriers that “separated
Americans with disabilities from the freedom they could [previ-
ously] glimpse, but not grasp.”4
Around the time the Act passed, roughly sixty-six percent of
working age individuals with disabilities were unemployed.  A simi-
lar proportion of such individuals wanted to work.5  Overcoming
the low level of employment for individuals with disabilities was an
important hurdle in this new era. In a survey of high level managers
and supervisors in the private sector, the International Center for
the Disabled found that roughly seventy-five percent of respondents
believed that job discrimination was an important barrier to in-
creased employment.6  Another seventy to eighty percent of
managers and supervisors thought that antidiscrimination laws
should be extended to protect disabled job applicants.7 Deeply im-
bedded stereotypes, misconceptions about productivity and
insurance costs, and fears about negative impacts on work environ-
ments all contributed to the low number of individuals with
disabilities in the workforce.8
One particular concern was an employer’s use of unnecessary job
requirements to screen out certain groups of individuals from con-
sideration.9  For example, an employer might require caseworkers
at a counseling center to possess a valid driver’s license.10  Although
seemingly innocuous, this requirement prevents people who can-
not obtain a valid license—including individuals with epilepsy—
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. See id. at 3.
5. ICD Survey I (1986) (waiting for ILL). This low level of employment impacted the
personal lives of individuals with disabilities. See SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (Yale Univ. Press 2009). For example,
individuals with disabilities who were not working reported feeling less economically self-
sufficient, less active in community life, and less satisfied with life compared to individuals
without disabilities. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 25 (1990).
6. See HARRIS (LOUIS) & ASSOCIATES ET AL., THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED
AMERICANS 23 (1987) (“ICD Survey II”).  The exact percentages responding “Yes” to the ques-
tion of whether discrimination by private-sector employers remained a barrier were the
following: seventy-two percent (top managers); seventy-six percent (EEO officers); eighty per-
cent (department heads and line managers); and seventy percent (small business managers).
7. See id. at 25.
8. See id. at 23; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 31, 33
(1986).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 33.
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33; E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I)
Technical Assistance Manual, Chapter IV, § 4.3, http://www.adaportal.org/Employment/
Browse_TAM_I/Chapter_IV_4-3.html.
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from employment in that job.  Implementing such a requirement is
especially suspect because possessing a valid driver’s license is only
tangentially related to a caseworker’s day-to-day tasks. A subtler use
of unnecessary job criteria would be to require office assistants to
use a QWERTY keyboard and mouse to enter data into a computer,
instead of some other technology.11
Despite Congress’s best efforts to eliminate the use of unneces-
sary job requirements, employers continue to deny workplace
opportunities to individuals on this basis. This Note argues that
dodging Title I’s prohibition on discrimination remains too easy in
part because the Act fails to require a searching inquiry into the
employer’s rationale for implementing different requirements. Part
I presents three tools that courts use when interpreting the mean-
ing of “essential functions.” Part II introduces two different
approaches to the “essential functions” inquiry and suggests why
the second approach—focusing on a wide range of factors other
than just the employer’s judgment—is preferable. Finally, Part III
offers two reforms to Section 12111(8) that would make it more
difficult for an employer to use unnecessary job requirements to
discriminate against individuals.
I. TITLE I AND SECTION 12111(8) OF THE ADA
Section 12111(8) is the crossroads for all employment discrimi-
nation claims brought under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.  To be protected under the Act, the plaintiff must
prove that she is “qualified” within the meaning of Section
12111(8).  This involves a two-step process.12  First, the plaintiff
must possess the requisite qualification standards for the job.13  This
is typically resolved with little difficulty.14  Second, and more diffi-
cult, the plaintiff must be able to perform the “essential functions”
of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation.15
11. See id.
12. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007).
13. Id.
14. For example, a UPS package-car driver job may require the plaintiff to prove that
she filled out a completed job application, possesses a valid driver’s license, or has a certain
level of seniority within the company. Id. at 982-83.  Although proving that the plaintiff satis-
fies the job’s prerequisites is usually not difficult, efforts to separate qualification standards
from essential functions can involve difficult line-drawing problems.  These problems present
an additional area for research, but are not the subject of this Note.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012). Whether the plaintiff requires a reasonable accommo-
dation and whether an accommodation allows her to perform the essential functions of the
job are not topics of this Note.
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This second step is problematic because Section 12111(8) does
not explain what makes a particular task “essential.”  In its entirety,
Section 12111(8) states only the following:
The term “qualified individual” means an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.  For the purposes of this subchapter, consid-
eration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has pre-
pared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evi-
dence of the essential functions of the job.16
Instead of explaining what makes a particular task “essential,”
Section 12111(8) directs courts to consider the employer’s judg-
ment. The text fails to explain what sources beyond the employer’s
judgment could be considered, however.  A judge trying to resolve
a discrimination claim may feel uneasy relying only on the em-
ployer’s opinion regarding whether it discriminated against the
employee. As Part II explains, courts—including the same federal
circuit—take different approaches to the “essential functions” in-
quiry. Some courts narrow their inquiry to the employer’s opinion,
while others look beyond the employer’s opinion and consider sev-
eral different factors.
Part I proceeds to consider some of the tools courts use to deter-
mine which tasks fall into the category of “essential functions.”  The
first tool is the plain meaning of essential functions.  Next is the
congressional intent behind the adoption of the “essential func-
tions” language.  The final tool is interpretive guidelines
established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.). Although these tools are available to courts, they are
applied inconsistently and unpredictably.  As a result, the meaning
of “essential functions” remains hard to pin down.
A. Plain Meaning of “Essential Functions”
The plain meaning of “essential” is a convenient starting place to
consider what that phrase includes. Discovering the word’s plain
16. Id. (emphasis added).
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meaning is complicated, however, because “essential” has two plau-
sible definitions.17  In common parlance, “essential” can refer to
something that is logically necessary18 or fundamentally impor-
tant.19  For example, a certain level of physical stamina and
endurance is “essential” to the firefighter responsible for entering
dwellings and rescuing people during emergencies.  These charac-
teristics are “indispensable” because without them the firefighter
cannot perform a core function of her position.
An “essential” task does not require such strict logical necessity,
however.  Instead, that term may refer to a task that is relatively
important, but that is not absolutely required to successfully per-
form the job. Although interpersonal skills are not “absolutely
necessary” for a firefighter—her ability to rescue does not necessa-
rily relate to her ability to communicate—the local fire
department’s hiring committee may think that they are of such im-
portance that any applicant who does not possess them will not be
hired.
The preceding example suggests that describing something as
“essential” causes some uncertainty with regard to what the speaker
means. Although courts do not explicitly interpret the plain mean-
ing of “essential functions,” their opinions touch on the two
different meanings.20 For example, in cases involving applicants for
the position of correctional officer, courts consistently hold that
those applicants must be able to physically restrain inmates during
an emergency.21 Correctional officers exist to ensure public safety
and order. Therefore, being able to restrain others is absolutely
17. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 663 (2d ed. 1987).  To be
sure, once a court decides that a particular function is “essential” the plaintiff must be able to
perform it with or without a reasonable accommodation.  In this sense, performance of the
function becomes “absolutely necessary.”  Here, my comments relate to how courts initially
determine which functions of the job are essential.  In other words, the two meanings relate
to how courts reach the decision as to which functions fall within the “essential functions”
category.
18. Id. Essential: adj. 1. absolutely necessary; indispensible.
19. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 427 (11th ed. 2005). Essential: adj. 2.a.:
of the utmost importance. See also OneLook, http://onelook.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2014)
(database of online dictionaries).
20. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981 (10th
Cir. 2012); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (asking employer
to prove connection between purported essential function and Department of Transporta-
tion hearing test); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2001).
21. See Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2000); Mar-
tin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds); Miller v.
Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997).
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necessary before an applicant can be hired as a correctional
officer.22
Describing a task as logically necessary is helpful when, like in the
correctional officer context, the job’s purpose is more discrete. The
more discrete a job’s purpose, the clearer the relative importance
of each task becomes. Problems arise, however, when the job’s pur-
pose is harder to define. In this situation, courts will balance several
different factors to determine the relative importance of the con-
tested job requirement.23
Considering the relative importance of different job require-
ments can create difficult line-drawing problems.  For example, if
the various tasks of a job are plotted along a spectrum from unim-
portant to absolutely necessary, then a court must decide the point
at which tasks become “essential.”  Because the plain meaning of
“essential” does not clearly delineate this point, courts must look
beyond Section 12111(8) to determine where it lies.  The next sec-
tion will explore one of the first sources beyond the text that many
courts look: congressional intent.
B. Congressional Intent behind “Essential Functions”
There are nine Congressional Reports (Reports) that detail the
ADA’s contents and underlying purpose. These Reports include a
wide range of information such as studies and other facts that went
into the drafting of the Act. Three of these Reports focus primarily
on Title I and the meaning of its provisions. These reports come
from the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, the
House Education and Labor Committee, and the House Judiciary
Committee, and contain three helpful rules for constructing the
meaning of “essential functions.”
The first rule is that “essential” refers to the “fundamental” tasks
of the position. It does not refer to “marginal” tasks. Juxtaposing
“fundamental” with “marginal” suggests two basic propositions:
first, that different tasks have different levels of importance, and
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (2012) (stating that a particular task is essential if
“the reason the position exists is to perform that function”).
23. See Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d at 1000 (Holloway, J., dissenting); Skerski, 257 F.3d at
280 (holding that “[a]lthough ‘may climb poles’ is listed as an aspect of one of Time
Warner’s essential functions, the failure of both job descriptions to list ‘climbing’ under the
heading ‘Essential Functions’ suggests one could view climbing as a useful skill or method to
perform the essential functions of the job but that it is not itself an essential function of the
installer technician position.”) (emphasis added).
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second, that “fundamental” tasks have a closer relation to the job’s
overall purpose than those tasks that are “marginal.”
Protecting an employer’s use of “fundamental” tasks, but not
“marginal” tasks is an important concept. At the time the Act was
drafted, employers used unrelated tasks to unfairly disqualify appli-
cants.24 The drafters of Title I were concerned that if an employer
could use unnecessary tasks—such as requiring caseworkers at a
counseling center to possess a valid driver’s license25—to screen ap-
plicants, then it could mask discriminatory practices.26 Therefore,
the drafters constrained Title I’s protection to those tasks that
closely related to the job’s core function.
The second rule of construction is that an applicant does not
have to perform an essential function in a particular manner. This
idea is closely related to the concept of “reasonable accommoda-
tion” also contained in Section 12111(8).27  By definition, a
reasonable accommodation recognizes that individuals with disabil-
ities may perform tasks differently than individuals without
disabilities.28 Relating these two ideas, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee noted that “essential functions are those which must be
performed, even if the manner in which particular job tasks com-
prising those functions are performed, or the equipment used in
performing them, may be different for an employee with a disability than
24. The distinction between tasks that are “fundamental” and “marginal” is found
throughout the legislative history on Title I. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33-34 (1990);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2012); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230
(11th Cir. 2005); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 27 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that employer’s requirement that applicants to the position of Emergency Medi-
cal Technician be able to lift seventy pounds was “tested . . . only on rare occasions”);
E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I) Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 10.
25. For example, an employer that required caseworkers at a counseling center to pos-
sess a valid driver’s license or hairdressers to communicate orally barred individuals with
epilepsy and individuals who could not communicate orally from such jobs. See H.R. REP. NO.
101-485(III), at 33; E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I) Technical Assistance Manual,
supra note 10.
26. Leaders both inside and outside of the movement shared the belief that the lack of
employment opportunities was less the result of applicants’ inability to perform the job than
the result of discrimination. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 35 (1990); ICD SURVEY II, supra
note 6, at 23; TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AF-
FECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 8, at 31, 33; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE: PROGRESS ON LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FROM “TOWARD INDEPENDENCE” 46 (1988).
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 32; E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I)
Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 10; Gillen, 283 F.3d at 24.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33 (“The incorpora-
tion of the requirement of reasonable accommodation into the definition of ‘qualified
individual with a disability’ is meant to indicate that essential functions are those which must
be performed, even if the manner in which particular job tasks comprising those functions
are performed, or the equipment used in performing them, may be different for an em-
ployee with a disability than for a non-disabled employee.”).
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for a non-disabled employee.”29  In a job that requires the use of
computers, for instance, the essential function is not the ability to
manually enter information or visually read information on the
computer screen, but rather the more general “ability to access, in-
put, and retrieve information from the computer” without regard
to method of performance.30
This discussion suggests that the meaning of “essential” closely
relates to the purpose of the job.  Instead of focusing on the man-
ner in which the job is performed, the use of “essential” directs
attention away from particulars to the common denominator of
achieving the job’s desired results.  By directing attention away
from on-paper job requirements and toward the applicant’s on-the-
job ability, the drafters of Title I indicated that “essential” is a flexi-
ble term.31  Congressional Committee Reports suggest that focusing
on results instead of a particular physical ability is one of the most
important protections that Title I offers because “misconceptions
about the abilities and inabilities of persons with disabilities” were
pervasive among employers.32
The third and final rule of construction relates to the method of
analysis the drafters intended courts to use: a multi-factored, bal-
ancing test. As the drafters noted, when conducting the essential
functions inquiry, courts must “review the job duty not in isolation,
but in the context of the actual work environment.”33  Only by
weighing multiple aspects of an employee’s job could courts deter-
mine the relative importance of each function and whether the
particular function in question is “essential.”34
These three rules of construction remain broad parameters for a
court to follow. Although they provide some guidance, these rules
do not clarify how much weight to give to the employer’s judgment.35
If courts have only these rules to rely upon, then consistently and
29. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 5, at 20; Gillen, 283 F.3d at 29.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 32.
33. Id. at 33.
34. To be sure, the legislative history does not indicate to what extent courts should
involve themselves in analyzing the relative importance of each function.  This is a key short-
coming of the statute because the more robust the court’s inquiry, the harder it becomes for
employers to mask marginal tasks as essential. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n) (2012); E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I) Technical Assistance Manual,
supra note 10.
35. The House Judiciary Committee considered whether there should be a presumption
created in favor of such judgment and expressly rejected it.  Although § 12111(8) indicates
that “consideration shall be given” to the employer’s judgment, the Committee stated that
such language “simply assures that the employer’s determination of essential functions is
considered.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 34.
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predictably deciding which functions fall under Section 12111(8)’s
purview will be difficult.
To reliably determine the essential functions of the position in
question, courts must look elsewhere.
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Interpretive Guidance
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Interpretive
Guidance (Guidance) is the next best source to consider.36  The
Guidance presents a list of seven relevant factors courts should con-
sider when deciding whether a particular function is essential.
These factors include the following:
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are
essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the
function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job;
and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar
jobs.37
36. Congress empowered the E.E.O.C. to enact regulations that inform courts and em-
ployers regarding the meaning of the ADA’s various provisions. See 29 C.F.R. 1630
(appendix) (first paragraph).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2012). Additionally, the Guidance presents three reasons
why a particular function should count as essential: the position exists to perform the task,
there are a limited number of other employees who could perform the task, or the function
is highly specialized. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (2012).  Moreover, these factors are not exclu-
sive.  In explaining how to determine whether a function is essential, the E.E.O.C. states that
“all relevant evidence should be considered” and that “[g]reater weight will not be granted to
the types of evidence included on the list than to types of evidence not listed.” Appendix to
Pt. 1630, Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV (2013), at 396. It appears the E.E.O.C.
wanted courts to analyze the above factors and then conclude, based on one or more of the
specified reasons, whether a particular function is “essential.” See id. at 396-97 (explaining
that Part 1630 lists various types of evidence that should be considered in determining
whether a particular function is essential).
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Using these factors to guide the essential functions inquiry has
the primary benefit of creating a consistent and predictable analyti-
cal framework. Unlike the three rules of construction from the
legislative history that suffer from a high level of generality, these
factors help narrow the trier of fact’s attention to specific and ob-
jective considerations. As a result, using these factors might
contribute to more robust decision-making because courts would
consider a more complete set of factual circumstances.
In addition to listing factors for a court to consider, the E.E.O.C.,
like the House Judiciary Committee, believed that essential func-
tions closely relate to the employee’s on-the-job performance.  In a
manual designed to help employers comply with Title I, the
E.E.O.C. suggested that employers, when “identifying an essential
function to determine if an individual with a disability is qualified,”
should “focus on the purpose of the function and the result to be
accomplished, rather than the manner in which the function pres-
ently is performed.”38  In a job that requires moving heavy packages
to a storage room, for instance, the essential function is the ability
to accomplish this task, irrespective of whether doing so involves
lifting or carrying the packages in a certain way.39  This example, in
addition to those cited in the Reports, suggests that the same job
can be accomplished multiple ways. As a result, a court should not
focus on whether the applicant can perform the job according to
only one method of performance. Rather, the court should focus
on whether the applicant can achieve the job’s “desired result” us-
ing an alternative method of performance that takes into account
her unique abilities.40
Although the Guidance is available to courts, its consistent appli-
cation is hampered by being non-binding.  Courts are free to use
these factors as much or as little as they want.  Furthermore, the list
of factors is not exhaustive—courts can choose some factors on the
list, or look beyond to consider an entirely different set of factors.
The non-binding and non-exhaustive nature of these factors under-
cuts their effectiveness.  Thus, the extent to which courts use these
factors differs across jurisdictions.41
38. E.E.O.C. Technical Assistance Manual (1992) at 34 (emphasis in original).
39. E.E.O.C. Employment Provisions (Title I) Technical Assistance Manual, Chapter V,
§ 5.5(f), http://www.adaportal.org/Employment/Browse_TAM_I/Chapter_V_5-5.html.
40. Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
legislative history behind Section 12111(8) indicates that the essential function inquiry “fo-
cuses on the desired result rather than the means of accomplishing it”).
41. Compare D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying
on E.E.O.C. factors while conducting essential functions inquiry), with Gratzl v. Office of
Chief Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2010)
(conducting essential functions inquiry without relying on E.E.O.C. factors).
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Taken together, the plain meaning, the three rules of construc-
tion from the legislative history, and the E.E.O.C. factors provide
the basic background for interpreting the meaning of “essential
functions.” Indeed, courts typically use at least one of these sources
when conducting the essential functions inquiry. The problem that
arises, however, is that courts do not have a consistent analytical
framework. Some courts guide their analysis using the E.E.O.C. fac-
tors, while other courts pay them little or no attention.  Still other
courts confine their analysis to the text of Section 12111(8), while
others look beyond the text to consider Title I’s legislative history.
Part II will discuss how courts use these various sources when deter-
mining whether discriminatory job requirements are essential.
II. SECTION 12111(8) AND DISCRIMINATORY JOB REQUIREMENTS
IN THE CASE LAW
The ability to define a job’s essential functions allows employers
to undermine Title I’s mandate of eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.  As long as employers can draw
a connection between the function at issue and the job’s purpose,
the plaintiff is at a disadvantage to win her discrimination claim. In
the absence of a limiting principle, the ambiguity of the phrase “es-
sential functions” dilutes Title I’s protections against employment
discrimination. Individuals with disabilities continue to be sub-
jected to discriminatory selection criteria, but clarifying the
meaning of “essential functions” would help counteract Section
12111(8)’s current weakness.
Part II analyzes how courts address discriminatory job require-
ments. These requirements present sensitive concerns because they
explicitly screen out an applicant on the basis of her disability.42
Examples of such job requirements include requiring an employee
with vertigo to work on a conveyor belt43 or a nurse with rheuma-
toid arthritis to lift patients onto hospital beds.44  Eliminating the
42. See Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 722-23 (6th Cir. 2000)
(determining whether deputy sheriff with severe physical restrictions must physically restrain
inmates); Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1997) (deciding whether
paraplegic firefighter must engage in fire suppression activities); Barnes v. Nw. Iowa Health
Ctr., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1068, 1082-83 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (analyzing whether employee
with rheumatoid arthritis had to lift patients onto hospital beds); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35
(1989).
43. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2005).
44. Barnes, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1082-83.
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unjustified use of such requirements is the linchpin of Title I’s pro-
tections.45  Thus, how courts analyze such requirements is a good
way to see how effective Section 12111(8) is to combat potential
discrimination. This Part contends that there are two main ap-
proaches that courts take when conducting the essential functions
inquiry.
A. Favoring the Employer’s Judgment
The first approach is characterized by deferring to an employer’s
judgment regarding which job functions are essential.  Instead of
analyzing different factors relating to the employment relationship,
this approach typically begins and ends with considering the em-
ployer’s opinion. The case of Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
Picture People, Inc.46 is illustrative. Picture People terminated Jessica
Chrysler, a congenitally deaf employee, because her lack of oral
communication skills allegedly burdened the operation of Picture
People’s business.47  The E.E.O.C. sued Picture People on behalf of
Chrysler, alleging that Picture People unlawfully discriminated
against her under Title I.  At issue was whether the essential func-
tions of Chrysler’s position included “verbal” communication skills
or “effective” communication skills.48  A majority of the Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed that verbal communication skills were essential.49
The court began its discussion by listing the seven E.E.O.C. fac-
tors.50 It quickly narrowed its attention, however, to Picture
People’s opinion that oral communication skills were essential.51
Restricting focus to the employer’s judgment was appropriate be-
cause the essential function inquiry “is not intended to second
45. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34  (stating that “[t]he requirement that job criteria actually
measure ability required by the job is a critical protection against discrimination based on
disability . . . . If a person with a disability applies for a job and meets all selection criteria
except one that he or she cannot meet because of a disability, the criteria must concern an
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored to measure the person’s
actual ability to do an essential function of the job.”).
46. 684 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2012).
47. Id. at 985-86.
48. Picture People originally hired Chrysler for the position of “performer,” which re-
quired working in the camera room where she interacted daily with patrons in oftentimes
stressful and chaotic situations.  Over the span of her employment, Chrysler conducted be-
tween fifteen and twenty photo sessions with different families. Id. at 983-84, 986-87.
49. Id. at 987.
50. Id. at 986.
51. Id.
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guess the employer or to require [it] to lower company stan-
dards.”52  As long as the function in question is “job-related,
uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity, the em-
ployer has a right to establish what a job is and what is required to
perform it.”53
Based on Picture People’s requirement that employees possess
the ability to verbally communicate, and its contention that non-
verbal communication impacted the efficient operation of its busi-
ness, the majority concluded that all applicants to Chrysler’s
position “must be able to verbally communicate with customers.”54
The majority ended its analysis by noting that “nothing suggests
that gestures, pantomime, and written communication are similarly
effective and efficient [as oral communication].”55
Gratzl v. Office of Chief Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd Judicial
Circuits also demonstrates this approach to the essential functions
inquiry.56  Jeanne Gratzl, a court reporter hired to work in a control
room and who suffered from incontinence, sued her employer after
new workplace rules required all court reporters to rotate through
in-court proceedings.57  Due to her condition, Gratzl was unable to
participate in such rotations without imposing a significant burden
on courtroom procedures.58
In analyzing whether rotation through in-court proceedings was
an essential function of her position, the Seventh Circuit gave con-
siderable weight to the employer’s judgment.59  Referring to Title I
employment discrimination claims more generally, the Seventh Cir-
cuit clarified that not only will it consider the employer’s opinion as
evidence of which functions are essential, but that it will presume
such an opinion to be correct.60  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
employer’s judgment because Gratzl failed to present enough evi-
dence to rebut this presumption.61
52. Id. (quoting Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2009))
(internal quotations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. Chrysler’s position while employed by Picture People, Inc. was “performer.”
55. Id. at 986-87.
56. 601 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 676-79.
58. Id. at 677.
59. Id. at 679.
60. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, an amendment that would have created a pre-
sumption in favor of the employer’s opinion regarding which functions are essential was
specifically rejected during Title I’s drafting process. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33
(1990).
61. Gratzl, 601 F.3d at 679-80.
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The Tenth and Seventh Circuits are not alone in deferring to an
employer’s judgment.62  Other courts agree that an employer’s
judgment should not be second-guessed during the essential func-
tion inquiry.63  The reliance that these courts place on an
employer’s judgment is supported by the text of Section 12111(8).
The express language of the statute makes clear that the employer’s
opinion regarding which functions are essential must factor into a
court’s analysis.64 Because many judges focus primarily, or even ex-
clusively, on the text of a statute when interpreting its meaning, it is
no surprise that the employer’s judgment plays a prominent role in
many courts’ analysis.65
There are additional reasons to focus on the employer’s judg-
ment.  An employer’s opinion—clearly expressed in written job
descriptions or deposition testimony—may be readily available. In-
terpreting the meaning of “essential” through other sources can be
more difficult and time-consuming. Additionally, treading into the
depths of legislative materials is not an attractive alternative to clear
statements contained in written job descriptions or deposition
testimony.66
62. See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“a court must give substantial deference to an employer’s judgment”); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259
F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[i]n the absence of evidence of discriminatory animus, courts
generally give ‘substantial weight’ to the employer’s judgment”); Weigert v. Georgetown
Univ., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.C. 2000) (“[c]ourts defer ‘to the employer’s judgment’”);
Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 1996) (“whenever an employer gives
written descriptions of the essential functions of a job, those descriptions are entitled to
substantial deference”); Johnson v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Res., 983 F. Supp. 1464, 1473
n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“the employer did not consider that function to be minor and it is to
the employer’s judgment . . . that this Court must defer.”).
63. See Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 2006) (“our inquiry into
essential functions ‘is not intended to second guess the employer’”) (quoting Mason v. Avaya
Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004)); DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d
668, 674 (7th Cir. 1998) (“we do not otherwise second-guess the employer’s judgment in
describing the essential requirements for the job”).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012) (“For purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall
be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for
the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”).
65. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Cass R. Sunstein, Must For-
malism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639 (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994).
66. See Easterbrook, supra note 65; A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning,
and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 71-74 (1994).
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B. Totality of the Circumstances Approach
The second approach to discriminatory job requirements is very
different than the first approach.  Courts taking the second ap-
proach typically reduce the emphasis of the employer’s judgment
and consider it as one factor among many.67  Instead of deferring to
the employer’s opinion regarding which functions are essential,
these courts focus on the highly factual nature of the employment
relationship.68
Courts that fall into this second category more closely scrutinize
the employer’s rationale for adopting the job requirement in ques-
tion.  For example, in Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc.69 the
plaintiff, a genetic amputee, was denied the position of Emergency
Medical Technician (EMT) because she did not have functional use
of two hands.70  Instead of deferring to the employer, the First Cir-
cuit clarified that the essential functions inquiry cannot depend on
only the employer’s judgment.  Rather, the inquiry must “involve[ ]
67. See Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“[w]hile we generally give substantial weight to the employer’s view of job requirements in
the absence of evidence of discriminatory animus, it is only one factor in the analysis”); De-
ane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (“while ‘inquiry into the essential
functions is not intended to second guess an employer’s business judgment’ . . . whether a
particular function is essential ‘is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case
basis [based on] all relevant evidence’ “) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (em-
phasis in original); Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11th Cir.
1985) (aff’d, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)) (“[t]he court is obligated to scrutinize the evidence before
determining whether the defendant’s justifications reflect a well-informed judgment
grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives”).
68. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 991 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that
“the ADA and implementing regulations direct fact finders to consider” at least six different
factors when considering whether a function is essential); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that whether a function is essential “is evaluated
on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors”); Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337
F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[d]etermining whether a particular function is essential is
a factual inquiry”); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“none of the factors [outlined in E.E.O.C. Interpretive Guidance] nor any of the evidentiary
examples alone are necessarily dispositive”); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d at 148 (“
‘the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential’ and ‘written job descriptions
prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants’ are two possible types of evidence . . .
but . . . such evidence is not to be given greater weight simply because it is included in the”
E.E.O.C. Interpretive Guidance) (quoting E.E.O.C. Interpretive Guidance) (emphasis in the
original); Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (“considerations set
out in this regulation [E.E.O.C. Guidance] are fact intensive . . . . the regulations themselves
state that the evidentiary examples provided are not meant to be exhaustive”); Benson v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 1995) (observing that “the ADA and implement-
ing regulations direct fact finders to consider” at least five different factors when considering
whether a function is essential).
69. 283 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).
70. There were two job requirements at issue.  The first was the applicant’s ability to lift
seventy pounds.  The First Circuit concluded that this was not an essential function of the
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fact-sensitive considerations . . . determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis.”71 In reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for Fallon Ambulance Service (Fallon), the employer, the First Cir-
cuit focused on the plaintiff’s ability to safely lift patients onto
stretchers using only one hand.72
Believing that “a court should give consideration to what an em-
ployer deems essential, but also should take care to ensure that
such functions are essential in fact,” the First Circuit refused to defer
to Fallon’s judgment that a two-handed lift was an essential func-
tion.73 Fallon argued that suspending the two-handed requirement
would interfere with its ability to safely respond to emergencies.
Putting this argument aside, the First Circuit focused on other evi-
dence, including Fallon’s conditional offer of employment to the
plaintiff, which suggested that the two-handed requirement was not
essential.74  Additionally, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health (MDPH) certified the plaintiff to work as an EMT for an-
other employer, further suggesting that functional use of two hands
was not required by the position.75
C. Totality of the Circumstances Approach is Preferable
The First Circuit’s willingness to look beyond the employer’s
judgment is striking given that the two-handed lift requirement was
imposed because of safety concerns that arise when EMTs respond
to emergencies.76  Some courts are more willing to defer to the em-
ployer when the job implicates public safety concerns.77  The First
EMT position because the employer enforced it infrequently. Id. at 27.  The second require-
ment involved “ ‘[l]ifting with two hands individually up to 70 pounds for a total height of 6
inches from knuckle height occasionally.’ ” Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 27-28.
73. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). But see Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st
Cir. 2006) (maintaining that courts should defer to the employer’s opinion because the “in-
quiry into essential functions ‘is not intended to second guess the employer’ ”); Kvorjak v.
Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that “courts generally give ‘substantial
weight’ to the employer’s judgment as to what functions are essential.’ ”). In both Mulloy and
Kvorjak, the central issue was whether presence at work was an essential function of the plain-
tiff’s position.  The First Circuit’s willingness to defer to the employer in “presence at work”
cases, but to apply greater scrutiny in cases like Gillen further suggests that courts can be as
critical or as hands-off as they want.
74. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 27.
75. Id. at 19 and 28.
76. Id. at 19.
77. See, e.g., Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that em-
ployer lawfully imposed discriminatory requirement against diabetic park ranger despite
absence of diabetes-related incident).
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Circuit, however, justified its conclusion as achieving “one of the
primary goals of the ADA: ‘to prohibit employers from making ad-
verse employment decisions based on stereotypes and
generalizations associated with the individual’s disability rather
than on the individual’s actual characteristics.’”78  The more a
court inquires into the relationship between the plaintiff’s actual
characteristics, the job’s purpose, and the job requirement at issue,
the more confident the court can be that the employer either is or
is not unlawfully discriminating against the applicant.
Scrutinizing the employer’s opinion is therefore critically impor-
tant to protecting the plaintiff against unlawful discrimination.79  In
many ways, the Gillen and Picture People courts begin from the same
set of facts. In each case, the employer denied the plaintiff employ-
ment because she could not perform a discriminatory job
requirement.  Each plaintiff could successfully achieve the “desired
results” of her job, however.80  Thus, the divergent conclusions
reached by these courts stem less from factual differences than
from differences in the method of analysis used. Whereas the Tenth
Circuit focused on the employer’s opinion and how the plaintiff
performed the job, the First Circuit went beyond the employer’s
opinion and focused on whether the plaintiff, based on her actual
characteristics, could achieve the job’s “desired results.”81
The problem is that current Section 12111(8) supports both ap-
proaches.82 Although proponents of the first approach ground
their analysis in the text of the statute, nothing in the language of
78. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 29 (quoting EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089,
1097 (6th Cir. 1998)). The dissenting opinion in Picture People similarly proclaimed that a
reviewing court must keep the employer from “ ‘turn[ing] every condition of employment
[. . .] into [. . .] an essential job function.’ ”  Restricting the essential functions inquiry to
Chrysler’s physical inabilities is dangerous because it “eliminate[s] an entire class of disabled
persons” from applying for a particular position. 684 F.3d 981, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2012).
79. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989) (“Hence, the requirement that job selection
procedures be ‘job-related and consistent with business necessity’ underscores the need to
examine all selection criteria to assure that they not only provide an accurate measure of an
applicant’s actual ability to perform the job, but that even if they do provide such a measure,
a disabled applicant is offered a ‘reasonable accommodation’ to meet the criteria that relate
to the essential functions of the job at issue.”).
80. Chrysler did not receive any customer complaints against her while employed by
Picture People, Inc. Picture People, 684 F.3d at 995. If her communication skills were truly a
problem, then it is reasonable to expect that a customer would have filed a complaint with
the employer.  Instead of filing a complaint, one family liked Chrysler’s work so much that
they returned for another portrait session. Id.
81. Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
legislative history behind Section 12111(8) indicates that the essential function inquiry “fo-
cuses on the desired result rather than the means of accomplishing it”).
82. Compare S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 36 (1989) (describing the importance of examining
all selection criteria to make sure that “paternalistic concerns for the disabled person’s own
safety not be used to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant”), and H.R. REP. NO. 101-
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Section 12111(8) says that an employer’s judgment is the only factor
to consider. In fact, the text is silent regarding how much weight
should be assigned to the employer’s judgment.  The only confi-
dent conclusion based on the text is that such judgment must play
some role in the essential functions inquiry.
Because “deference” suggests a hands-off approach, courts that
accept the employer’s judgment as given risk overlooking discrimi-
natory practices.  This, in turn, risks eliminating different groups of
individuals from the workforce.83 Looking beyond the text to con-
sider the underlying goals of Section 12111(8) helps clarify what
courts ought to consider during the essential functions inquiry.
Instead of a hands-off approach, the drafters of Title I envisioned
somewhat of a cat and mouse game between courts and employers.
The ADA allows employers to use job requirements that are “job-
related” and “consistent with business necessity,” even if their appli-
cation discriminates against certain groups of individuals.84 It is the
role of the courts to make sure that an employer’s reasons for using
such requirements are justified and not a smokescreen for unlawful
discrimination. Therefore, courts must examine how the require-
ment at issue—for example, the two-handed lift in Gillen—relates to
the most important aspects of the job. .
Current Section 12111(8) fails to mention this delicate balanc-
ing.85  In failing to do so, courts continue to reach inconsistent
results based on varying levels of “deference” and “scrutiny” applied
485(III), at 33 (1990) (underscoring that it is necessary to “review the job duty not in isola-
tion, but in the context of the actual work environment”), and Appendix to Pt. 1630,
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV (2013), at 396 (clarifying that “all relevant evidence
should be considered” when determining which functions are essential), with S. REP. NO. 101-
116, at 23 (1989) (stating that “consideration should be given to the employer’s judgment
regarding what functions are essential”), and H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990) (af-
firming that consideration should be given to the employer’s judgment regarding what
functions are essential), and Appendix to Pt. 1630, Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV
(2013), at 396 (cautioning that the essential functions inquiry “is not intended to second
guess an employer’s business judgment with regard to production standards . . . nor to re-
quire employers to lower such standards”), and Section 12111(8) (stating that “consideration
shall be given” to the employer’s judgment).
83. Picture People, 684 F.3d at 997.
84. Section 12112(b)(6).
85. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 19, 24 (1989) (“[Title I] provides that employment deci-
sions must not have the purpose of effect of subjecting a qualified individual with a disability
to discrimination on the basis of his or her disability.”).  The Senate Report also notes that
“stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities, or more correctly the inabilities, of per-
sons with disabilities are still pervasive today. Every government and private study on the issue
has shown that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities because of stereotypes,
discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears about increased costs and decreased pro-
ductivity.” Id. at 34.
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to the employer’s job requirements. Part III proposes two amend-
ments to Section 12111(8) that would help fix this problem.
III. AMENDING THE TEXT OF SECTION 12111(8)
Considered separately, the current text of Section 12111(8), its
legislative history, and the E.E.O.C. factors fail to satisfactorily de-
fine “essential functions.”  Synthesizing these sources, however, lays
the groundwork for reforming Section 12111(8) and making Title
I’s protections more effective.
This Part proposes two reforms to current Section 12111(8) that
would clarify the understanding of “essential functions.”  First, the
statutory text should expressly mention that “essential functions”
closely relates to achieving the “desired results” of the position. Sec-
ond, the statutory text should incorporate the seven factors from
the Guidance. Providing courts with a set of guidelines will help
clarify that the employer’s judgment is only one factor among many
to consider. The rest of this Part discusses each reform in turn.
A. Reference to the “Desired Results” of the Position
Individuals with disabilities may perform a certain task differently
because of their unique physical or cognitive characteristics. Unless
the employer can prove that employment would cause an undue
burden or that the employee truly cannot perform what the job
demands, the employer should not be allowed to terminate such an
individual. Otherwise, employers place value judgments on one
method of performance over another to the detriment of the em-
ployee with the disability.  As long as the employee can achieve the
result of the position with reasonable or no additional cost, each
method of performance should be valued equally.86  The descrip-
tion of essential functions in the legislative history and E.E.O.C.
regulations reinforces this idea.87
Focusing on “desired results” aligns with Title I’s underlying goal
of eliminating unlawful discrimination. Unlike other federal legisla-
tion that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race
86. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33 (1990) (“essential functions are those which must
be performed, even if the manner in which particular job tasks comprising those functions
are performed, or the equipment used in performing them, may be different for an em-
ployee with a disability than for a non-disabled employee.”). See also Section 12101 (“physical
or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of
society”).
87. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.
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or gender, the ADA lets an individual’s disability remain “visible”
during the hiring phase. For example, the employer is allowed to
consider how an applicant’s disability helps or hinders her ability to
perform the job88 and can make the hiring decision accordingly. In
the words of Professor Robert C. Post, this means that disabled ap-
plicants do not have an “audition screen” to stand behind when
applying for a job.89
For Title I to guard against unlawful discrimination, it must do so
in a way different from traditional antidiscrimination statutes. Fill-
ing this gap is precisely where the concept of “desired results” is
aimed. Encouraging courts to focus on how applicants might be
able to perform the job in relatively low-cost, alternative ways both
reinforces each individual applicant’s feeling of self-worth and pro-
tects each applicant from unfair discrimination that bears no
relation to the job.
Amending the statutory text to include a reference to “desired
results” assumes that on some level courts will look beyond the em-
ployer’s judgment. For example, this might require courts to
consider nontraditional ways to perform a job. The First Circuit in
Gillen noted that the two-hand requirement was outdated because it
was based on “historical fact—how EMT work traditionally has been
performed.”90  In other situations, courts might treat a particular
task as a “useful skill or method to perform the essential functions
of the job.”91
These various approaches are required if the equality principal
underlying the ADA is to have effect. Without scrutinizing how the
plaintiff’s actual characteristics relate to performing the job, courts
make it easier for employers to use discriminatory practices.92 Ar-
guably, this is precisely what the Tenth Circuit failed to do in Picture
People.93 Chrysler performed her job without receiving any docu-
mented complaints from customers,94 but the majority nonetheless
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2012); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 28-
29 (1st Cir. 2002). See generally Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000)
89. See Post, supra note 88, at 11-12.
90. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 28.
91. Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2001).
92. See Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (“ ‘an em-
ployer may not turn every condition of employment which it elects to adopt into a job
function, let alone an essential job function, merely by including it in a job description’ ”)
(quoting Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000)).
93. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 998-99
(10th Cir. 2012) (dissenting opinion).
94. There was even evidence that a family rebooked another photo session with Chrysler
because it liked her so much. Id. at 995.
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concluded that verbal communication was an efficient, and there-
fore necessary, skill.
As noted in Part II, focusing the essential functions inquiry on
methods of performance risks eliminating entire groups of individ-
uals from the workforce. It also reduces the hiring question to a
one-dimensional focus on the applicant’s current physical or cogni-
tive ability, instead of expanding consideration to the applicant’s
potential.95 Overall, this makes hiring decisions much more rigid.
Although Title I allows employers to consider an applicant’s disabil-
ity, the drafters aspired to have employers look beyond this
characteristic.  The “essential functions” inquiry was designed as a
flexible tool to shift emphasis away from physical “differences” to
whether the applicant could achieve the desired results of the posi-
tion.  Shifting this emphasis would help integrate individuals with
disabilities into the workforce and American society.
B. Clarifying the Weight of the Employer’s Judgment
Section 12111(8) leaves little doubt that courts must consider the
employer’s opinion when determining whether a particular func-
tion is essential. The reasons for this are clear. Employers often
know how particular jobs relate to the surrounding office or fac-
tory. They also typically know what role each job plays and what
goals each job is meant to achieve. Although these informational
advantages make the employer’s opinion a good place to begin the
essential functions inquiry, they do not justify making such opinion
the only consideration.  The Congressional Reports and E.E.O.C.
Guidance suggest that an employer’s opinion is only one factor
among many to consider during the essential functions inquiry.96
Section 12111(8) is inadequate, however, because it does not list
other factors to consider or even to what extent the employer’s
95. Id. at 1000 (“Moreover, lawsuits like Ms. Chrysler’s are precisely the mechanism Con-
gress envisioned for correcting such injustice [allowing discrimination to deny persons with
disabilities from fully participating in society].”).  To be sure, there are certain situations—
where public safety is a huge concern. For example, courts agree to take this risk in the
context of prison guards and park rangers.
96. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989) (describing the importance of examining all
selection criteria to make sure that “paternalistic concerns for the disabled person’s own
safety not be used to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485(III), at 33 (1990) (underscoring that it is necessary to “review the job duty not in isola-
tion, but in the context of the actual work environment”); Appendix to Pt. 1630, Interpretive
Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV (2013), at 396 (clarifying that “all relevant evidence should be
considered” when determining which functions are essential).
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opinion should be used as evidence. By mentioning only the em-
ployer’s judgment, the statute risks having courts over rely on such
judgment.
The Reports mentioned in Part I strongly suggest that “defer-
ring” or giving “substantial weight” to employers limits Title I’s
effectiveness. As the Reports mention, one of Title I’s targets—if
not its main target—was employers.97 For example, the requirement
that selection criteria “actually measure skills required by the job”
was critical to counteract pervasive employer-based discrimina-
tion.98  More specifically, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources reported that “stereotypes and misconceptions”
about the productivity and cost of employing persons with disabili-
ties were shared across the population and that “[e]very
government and private study on the issue” concluded that such
discrimination led employers to use selection criteria that barred
disabled individuals from jobs.99 The House Education and Labor
Committee also cited discrimination’s pernicious effect on the op-
portunities for disabled individuals, stating that unfair job
requirements remained an “inexcusable barrier” to increased em-
ployment among individuals with disabilities.100
Deferring to employers is problematic because it risks allowing
managers and executives—the very targets of Title I’s antidis-
crimination mandate—to implement requirements without
providing a justification. As mentioned in Part II, the unique nature
of the ADA requires courts to play somewhat of a cat and mouse
game with employers.  Some discriminatory job requirements—
those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity—
97. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 8-9 and H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 33 (noting the
multitude of discriminatory practices used by employers to deny individuals with disabilities
employment); H.R. REP NO. 101-485(III), at 31 (“The underlying premise of [Title I] is that
persons with disabilities should not be excluded from job opportunities unless they are actu-
ally unable to do the job. The requirement that job criteria actually measure skills required
by the job is a critical protection, because stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities
and inabilities of persons with disabilities continue to be pervasive.”); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at
35 (observing that “[e]very government and private study on the issue [of employment dis-
crimination] has shown that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities because of
stereotypes, discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears about increased costs and de-
creased productivity”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 71 (1990) (incorporating the Senate
Report’s finding that “employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities because of stereo-
types, discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears about increased costs and decreased
productivity”).
98. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 31.
99. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 33 (citing studies
and testimony indicating that discrimination remains an “inexcusable barrier” to increased
employment for persons with disabilities); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 31 (affirming that
stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities of persons with disabilities are pervasive).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 33.
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are lawful, but without scrutinizing an employer’s rationale, courts
cannot determine whether any given requirement is justified. In-
stead of favoring the employer, the drafters strongly suggested that
courts should carefully analyze an employer’s stated reasons for im-
plementing the requirement at issue.
Incorporating the factors from the E.E.O.C. Guidance into the
statutory language would provide courts with a concrete set of
guidelines to consider.101  As noted in Part I, the Guidance recom-
mends that “all relevant evidence should be considered” during the
essential functions inquiry.102  Because no single factor is disposi-
tive, “[g]reater weight will not be granted to the types of evidence
included on the list than to the types of evidence not listed.”103  In-
corporating these factors would clarify that the essential functions
inquiry is factual in nature.  Instead of narrowing focus to a single
factor, this amendment would expand a court’s perspective to the
totality of the employment relationship.
The nature of the employment relationship makes a multi-fac-
tored test the preferred solution.  Workplaces and jobs differ across
various industries and sectors of the economy.  One occupation—
for example, “assembly line worker”—may have different responsi-
bilities, expectations, and hiring criteria based on the particular
nature of the workplace in which the job is situated.  What may be
an essential function to an assembly line worker in a Ford plant in
Detroit, MI, for instance, might only be marginal to an assembly
line worker in a Boeing plant in Seattle, WA.  Furthermore, assem-
bly line workers in the Ford plant itself may have such a diversity of
assignments that what is essential to one worker is not essential to
another.  All of these differences can impact the purpose, or “es-
sence,” of any single job. Inquiries into the purpose of a job
therefore must be flexible and sensitive to the particular circum-
stances of each case.  Narrowing a court’s attention to a subset of
factors—at the extreme, one factor—decreases the test’s flexibility
and severs the inquiry from its intended purpose: determining
whether the plaintiff can perform the essential functions of this or
that job.
101. As a reminder, these factors include: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which func-
tions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared by the employer; (3) the amount of
time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the
employee to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6)
the work experience of past employees in the job; and (7) the work experience of current
employees in the same or similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2012).
102. See supra Part I.C; Appendix to Pt. 1630, Interpretive Guidance, (2013), at 396.
103. Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV, at 396.
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Incorporating the E.E.O.C. factors into Section 12111(8) would
transform what is currently a rule-like approach focusing on a sin-
gle factor into more of a standard-like approach. As Professor
Kathleen Sullivan writes, a categorical, or rule-like, approach “de-
fines bright-line boundaries and then classifies fact situations as
falling on one side or the other.”104  Many courts, including the Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits, follow such a categorical approach.
Beginning from the list of tasks the employer deems essential, such
courts ask whether the plaintiff can perform the task at issue.  If she
cannot, then the court concludes that she is not a “qualified indi-
vidual” and that her lawsuit must fail.  The purpose of Title I,
however, is to maintain a flexible test that captures the unique cir-
cumstances presented by the particular plaintiff and job.
Clarifying the weight of the employer’s opinion and incorporat-
ing the E.E.O.C. factors are not drastic changes.  Many courts, for
instance, already acknowledge the inherently factual nature of the
essential functions inquiry and apply a multi-factored balancing ap-
proach using the seven factors.105  Furthermore, the Congressional
Reports are littered with references to the many factual considera-
tions that courts should take into account.106  The key point is to
incorporate these ideas into the express language of Section
12111(8), thereby clarifying that the essential functions inquiry is
fact-dependent.
According to Professor Sullivan, making this change may have
the residual impact of leveling the playing field between employers
and job applicants.107  The employer holds a superior position to
influence a court’s ultimate decision of which functions are essen-
tial because it produces the very job descriptions that that court will
rely upon at trial.  The employer also holds a superior position to
understand the overall structure of the workplace and the role of
each job within that structure.108  Deferring to the employer, given
its informational advantage over the plaintiff, tips the scales further
in its favor.  Because a  standard-like approach reduces the relative
weight of any one consideration, the “incentive[ ] for exploitation
104. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 59
(1992).
105. See supra note 68.
106. See supra note 82.
107. Sullivan, supra note 106, at 66-67.
108. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 991 (9th Cir. 2007) (agreeing
with the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Benson); Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,
1113 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer who disputes the plaintiff’s claim that she
can perform the essential functions must put on evidence establishing those functions be-
cause “much of the information which determine those essential functions lies uniquely with
the employer”).
FALL 2014] Designing a Flexible World for the Many 299
in situations in which knowledge or access to information is distrib-
uted unequally” is reduced.109  This makes the essential functions
inquiry fairer by redistributing advantage to the plaintiff.110
A question that arises is: Once Section 12111(8) incorporates this
list of factors, how should courts treat the employer’s judgment?
One solution is to allow the employer to explain how the require-
ment at issue is necessary to achieving the desired results of the job.
Allowing the employer to provide a preliminary explanation recog-
nizes its informational advantage in the workplace. A court should
not, however, give undue weight to this judgment and should then
allow the plaintiff a chance to explain how she can perform the job
a different way than the employer suggests is necessary. For exam-
ple, the plaintiff in Gillen could have argued that the two-handed
lift requirement was not necessary to effectively respond to emer-
gencies because other EMTs, including herself, were already
performing the job without the functional use of two hands.111
The key inquiry during this back-and-forth between the employer
and plaintiff revolves around the job’s intended goals.  Instead of
proving the importance of a requirement by showing how long it
has existed or how many employees must perform it, the employer
must explain how performing that requirement relates to the de-
sired results.  Keeping the focus of the litigation on this relationship
forces the employer to articulate a meaningful reason for denying
the plaintiff the job. In the future, this will help encourage employ-
ers to implement fair and meaningful requirements.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-four years ago, the Americans with Disabilities Act was
passed to eliminate unlawful discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. As then-President Bush remarked, the Act was intended
to knock down barriers for such individuals and usher them into
mainstream American society. Although the Act has helped ad-
vance the disability rights movement, it has done an inadequate job
of preventing employer-based discrimination. Employers continue
to use unnecessary job requirements that unjustifiably screen out
applicants on the basis of their disability, and courts often fail to
sufficiently scrutinize the employer’s judgment to make sure that
discriminatory job requirements are lawful.
109. Sullivan, supra note 106, at 66.
110. Id. at 66-67.
111. Cf. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2002).
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This Note has argued that Title I ought to be amended. This
amendment would encourage courts to take a broad approach to
the “essential functions” inquiry.  Instead of beginning and ending
the inquiry with the employer’s opinion, this amendment proposes
that courts consider other factors to ensure that the employer’s rea-
sons for using the discriminatory requirement relate to the actual
day-to-day performance of the job. This inquiry is crucial to making
sure that such a requirement is actually related to the goal of the
job and that individuals with disabilities are not unfairly discrimi-
nated against.
